Asbed Kotchikian
Since April 13, 2018 protesters in Armenia’s capital Yerevan have
been gathering in public spaces, barricading roads and demonstrating
against the apparent continuation of the country’s leadership under
former President (and newly minted Prime Minister) Serzh Sargsyan.
Sargsyan’s move to continue his rule came as he supported and
spearheaded through his Republican Party of Armenia (HHK in Armenian)
constitutional amendments in late 2015, which effectively transformed
the Republic from a presidential to a parliamentary system of
government.
While Sargsyan initially dismissed the claim that he was seeking the
office of PM, in early 2018 representatives of his HHK party as well as
his ally, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D),
started floating the idea that Sargsyan was the only apparent and
qualified candidate to continue managing the country as PM.
While the recent demonstrations, sit-in protests and acts of civil
disobedience are not a new phenomenon in the country, there are many
trends that are common to similar outbursts that have occurred in
Armenia in the past couple of years. The most notable of these include:
the summer 2015 “Electric Yerevan” movement which witnessed mass
demonstrations against the hike of electricity prices; and the July 2016
hostage crisis where a handful of Nagorno-Karabakh war veterans and
others stormed a police station in Yerevan, took hostages and demanded,
among other things, the resignation of then President Sargsyan.
The main functional similarities among the recent protests and
demonstrations in Armenia, is that they are all manifestations of
disenchantment and frustration with the political malaise that has
dominated the country in the past decade or so. This political
dissatisfaction has been closely associated with Sargsyan’s rule, who
has managed to consolidate all the levers of power to guarantee his
continued control of the country.
That being said, every time a socio-political issue triggers protests
and demonstrations in Armenia, there is almost always the same
reaction—or myths—that Armenians or Armenia analysts project and utilize
to either describe or discredit those events. This is especially true
for government and pro-government circles in Armenia as well as
organized diasporan institutions operating on a different plane than
that of Armenia. It should be noted that while talking about the
Armenian Diaspora, it is counter-intuitive to assume that all of the
diasporas are organized, or that the organized institutions represent
the majority of the diasporan views when it comes to issues in Armenia.
Myth 1: The protests are isolated cases of a few disgruntled individuals
The ability of any regime or a group to discredit their opponent
almost always comes down to the numbers game. To discredit any group or
movement, it’s always possible to downplay them as “few reckless
individuals” or to deny that the motivation for these gatherings are
nothing more than “adventurists” trying to make a name for themselves.
This myth is usually propagated by the regime and its supporters in,
what can be described as an “ostrich policy”, where ignoring the
sociopolitical ailments of a society and having a tunnel vision of what
is good in the country are a far better strategy than taking
responsibility and trying to address those issues.
This myth has been echoed on more than one occasion in Armenia during
the past several years (March 2008 events, “Electric Yerevan:, etc.)
and took the form of “eyewitness” accounts and news reports that
demonstrators were small in number and that the crowds gathered in
various public spaces were nothing more than a bunch of young
individuals who were just letting off steam. While it is true that most
of the demonstrations in Armenia have a large percentage of younger
(less than 30 year-old) activists, it is not unusual that this
demographic is more active and involved in social movements as it is the
generation that was either born or grew up in post-Soviet Armenia.
Unhindered by censorship and supported by social media, it is this group
that seems to have the ability and flexibility to mobilize and get
organized in order to channel not only their own frustration but also
the frustration of their parents.
Regardless of the number of protesters, whether they’re in the
hundreds or in the thousands, a responsible government should be
equipped to address those issues but more important to listen to what is
being said rather than dismiss it as “child’s play.”
Myth 2: Protesters are being led by opportunist politicians to further their own goals
One interesting phenomenon that almost all demonstrations, protest or
movements in Armenia (and elsewhere) have in common is that rarely do
they begin with leaders calling for action. The most common typology of
mass movements is that, more often than not, leadership emerges from the
movement but doesn’t necessarily initiate it. Protests and revolutions
in Ukraine (2004), Georgia (2003), Tunisia (2010), Egypt (2011), Iran
(1979) and elsewhere showed over and over again that mass protest and
uprisings rarely had a clearly defined and identified leaders; rather
the leadership emerged from the ranks or was sometimes hijacked (or
handed over by the protesters themselves) by political figures.
The need for politicians to be relevant at times of demonstrations or
revolutions is best captured by the words of Alexandre Auguste
Ledru-Rollin, a French politician “There go my people. I must find out
where they are going so I can lead them.” (While this quote or a
variation of it is attributed to Ledru-Rollin, it is more likely
apocryphal).
Nikol Pashinyan, the most visible face in the Yerevan demonstrations,
has been trying to establish himself as a viable opposition leader at a
time when no other political force or party has stood up in support of
the protesters. One cannot articulate the true motives of
Pashinyan—whether he truly believes in the movement or if it is just an
opportunity for him to become more relevant in Armenia’s political
scene—but he does have a record of unsuccessfully trying to play a
leading role in previous mass demonstrations in Yerevan (especially
during the 2015 “Electric Yerevan” movement and 2016 “Sasna Dzrer”
hostage crisis).
Regardless of the motives of politicians in attempting to lead
demonstrations, the true intention of these demonstrations cannot be
simply dismissed as adventurism or opportunism. However, there is always
a risk that any politician who manages to take control of a movement
might end up abandoning their constituents, thus throwing them into
deeper despair and hopelessness (something that occurred in the
aftermath of 2013 presidential elections and the ensuing mass
protests).
Myth 3: “Hidden hands” are guiding these protests
Perhaps one of the most common defense mechanisms to utilize force
against demonstrators, as well as to dismiss the true nature of the
discontent they articulate, is through false claims. One such claim and a
conspiratorial argument by regimes and their supporters is that
“outside forces are encouraging these movements to destabilize our
country.” This attitude and argument is not uniquely an Armenian
phenomenon; rather one can observe similar attitudes in the larger
post-Soviet space, the Middle East and other regions. (The list is long
but similar arguments have been used in Chile in 1970 after the election
of leftist Salvador Allende, in Egypt in 2011 during the Tahrir Square
demonstration, in Ukraine in 2013).
The epitome of this myth was in March 2008 when after the disputed
presidential elections in Armenia (which witnessed the rise of Sargsyan
to power), there were mass demonstrations in Armenia. The government
eventually utilized force to disperse the protesters with the support of
various political parties in and outside of the country. The most
common explanation given by diasporan organizations, which were
criticized of inaction at a time when human rights were being violated
in Armenia, was that “the government had provided undisputed proof that
the demonstrations were being controlled by outside forces and that it
was the prudent thing to close ranks with Sargsyan even if his election
was questionable.”
This strategy of “outsiders” threatening the nation has become more
prevalent in recent years around the globe and has provided populist
leaders with an opportunity to create enemies when there are none. Such
cases have occurred in Hungary recently under Viktor Orbán, in the
United States under Donald Trump and in Russia under Vladimir Putin.
Observing strategies like this, one cannot but help remember the
words of 18th century English writer Samuel Johnson: “Patriotism is the
last refuge of the scoundrel.”
Myth 4: Diaspora to the rescue?
One major misconception that still persists is the level and extent
of the potential contribution of Armenian Diaspora when it comes to
issues of socio-political justice in the Armenia. There have been many
attempts by political figures in Armenia (mostly opposition) to recruit
the help of the diaspora… mostly to no avail. This misconception is
perpetuated by the constant affirmation, dubbed the “diaspora as a
savior” syndrome, sought by some politicians. The erroneous view that
the diaspora can serve as savior for Armenia’s opposition has been
repeatedly manifested in recent years (be that the appeal that “Sasna
Dzrer” made to the diasporans to help their movement or be it the
invitation that Pashinyan has extended to “prominent” Armenian figures
such as Serge Tankian or Charles Aznavour to join their movement.
As mentioned above, a clear distinction should be made between the
organized diaspora institutions vs individuals who have their separate
connection, understanding and interpretation of events in Armenia.
Providing a factual analysis of what percentage of the Armenian Diaspora
is huddled around institutions (the most prominent ones being the
Armenian General Benevolent Union and the ARF-D) is near impossible. An
educated guess might be not more than 20%, which means that an
overwhelming number of diasporan Armenians are either indifferent to, or
have a limited impact on, socio-political issues in Armenia.
Regardless of the reasons why the Armenian Diaspora (be that the
organized masses or the independent individuals) is more often than not
passive about such events in Armenia, the fact remains that the
expectations of Armenians in Armenia from the Diaspora, far exceeds the
willingness of the Diaspora to engage in any meaningful contribution to
improve the political climate in the country.
One of the commonly repeated mantra in various circles has been the
positive role that the Armenian Diaspora could play in the
democratization process of Armenia. While this is not a farfetched
expectation, one has to keep in mind that even if a large number of
Armenians live in (quasi)democracies, most of them do not practice
democracy within their immediate institutions. Elections for
organizational and community leaders in most diasporic organizations are
not much different than what Armenia has witnessed in its on local and
general elections in the past two decades.
What adds insult to injury is that most of the diasporan media has
either criticized the recent demonstrations in Armenia or belittled
them, focusing instead on Genocide recognition or the 100th anniversary
celebration of the short-lived Armenia’s First Republic. This is not a
new phenomenon, and in recent years most Armenians in Armenia have come
to realize that for the Diaspora, maintaining the political status quo
is something acceptable even if that meant the consolidation of
Sargsyan’s power in Armenia and the increased chance of a single party
rule in the country.
Change, real change in Armenia, cannot be imported, it must be brewed
and implemented from within. It’s about Armenia’s citizens taking
ownership and demanding their rights without waiting for the diaspora’s
contribution. This realization seems to have taken root in recent years
where the diaspora’s role has become less relevant (at least among the
younger generation) in the minds of Armenian citizens.
Conclusion
Previous experiences of mass demonstrations and protests in Armenia
could provide a window as to how the latest “Reject Serzh” protests
might end. While the protesters might increase in number in the coming
days, the regime will not hesitate to wait for the right moment to use
limited force and dismantle the barricades and disperse the
demonstrators. It is often said that demonstrators learn from their
previous experiences but that is also true in the case of governments.
Utilizing excess force in the past (especially during “Electric
Yerevan” movement when the Armenian police used water cannons to
disperse the initial gathering of small number of protestors), could
swell the number of people in the streets.
The likelihood of this and any future protests to successfully change
the regime and achieve Sargsyan’s resignation as PM is quite low.
However, a more important issue that one has to keep in mind is that
demonstrations are not always able to realize the goals that they set
out to achieve. Over the past several years, demonstrations and protests
in Armenia have gone through predictable cycles. After the initial
outburst, mass gatherings and demands, they wither away until the next
outburst. The challenge has always been to find opportunities and
organization to continue with piecemeal attempts to reform the
electoral, political, educational or social spheres in between those
outbursts. This is most probably because of the absence of a viable
opposition party which could take on the mantle of social reform in
between elections and/or in between demonstrations.
Nevertheless, these flickers of demonstrations and civil
disobedience are an important mechanism to make sure that no matter how
much power is consolidated at the top echelons of government, the
ability to assemble and reject unilateral decisions by the regime will
always keep the glass ceiling of political oppression higher and, to
some extent, keep the political leadership on their toes. In an ideal
world, the energy and dedication of the demonstrators should be
channeled and translated into political/legislative action, but since
none of the political parties in Armenia (including self-labeled
opposition groups) is capable of translating that energy, the best that
one could hope for is to maintain the level of political awareness and
activism among the citizens.
Even if the repeated demonstrations in Armenia run the risk of
fomenting disenchantment, as they are not able to achieve the larger
goal of seeing the departure of Sargsyan and his regime, this is perhaps
an episode in the larger context of keeping Armenia’s citizens aware of
and responsible for protecting their rights.
Wars are won one battle at a time!
"Hetq," April 19, 2018 (http://hetq.am/eng/news/87561/its-the-people-stupid-debunking-the-myths-on-protests-in-armenia.html)
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