Nerses Kopalyan
If
we equate stability with security, and security with longevity, then
clearly we abide by the laws of continuity, hence providing the
conceptual basis for the continuation of Serzh Sargsyan as the country’s
leading political figure. We can better understand this through a more
nuanced framework. Wisdom is a virtue possible only through experience;
experience is a condition predicated on competence and competence is a
quality innate to a refined politician. That Serzh Sargsyan is a refined
politician is beyond debate. That Serzh Sargsyan is competent is a
foregone conclusion. That Serzh Sargsyan is extraordinarily experienced
cannot merit disagreement. And that Serzh Sargsyan, a consummate student
of strategy, exudes wisdom, is only evident by merely observing his
accomplishments. A selfless public servant who has devoted his life to
the advancement and betterment of the Armenian nation, Serzh Sargsyan
assumed the Presidency in 2008, amid turmoil and uncertainty, only to
steer the nation toward development, growth, and security.
During President Sargsyan’s tenure, Armenia underwent extraordinary
development in three important spheres. First, militarily, the armed
forces of the Republic not only transitioned from a traditional military
to a more mobile modern fighting force, but also attained some of the
most advanced weaponry for the field of battle. Collectively, Armenia
has become the most powerful military force in the Caucasus, whether in
fighting spirit, quality of soldiers, strategic advantage, or military
leaderships. Second, economically, Armenia’s economy diversified
exponentially under President Sargsyan’s tenure, as Armenia transitioned
into a service sector economy under the three pillars of banking,
tourism, and technology. Coupled with the impressive foreign investments
into Armenia’s economy, the unequivocal success of the Sargsyan
Administration cannot merit criticism. And thirdly, the extraordinary
advancement in culture; that is, the immersion of the Armenian homeland
with its vast Diaspora, with President Sargsyan as the architect of this
bridge that binds the Armenian culture the world throughout. Forthwith,
when considering the prolific achievements of President Sargsyan, and
his oeuvre of refinement, competence, experience, and wisdom, there
remains no debate that he is the natural and most qualified choice to
continue steering our nation toward progress as its Prime Minister.
Why
does this sound like the commentary of a prolific sycophant? Oh, I was
merely imitating Eduard Sharmazanov, Armen Ashotyan, Taron Margaryan,
Davit Harutunyan, Ara Babloyan, to say the least, and the whole cadre of
Republican (and Dashnak) court jesters that shamelessly worship at the
altar of an empty throne. But wait, why is the throne empty? Well, that
is because the esteemed Prime Minister does not have the courage to sit
on it: so he is simply hiding behind it. To deny his endeavor of
clinging to a throne, Sargsyan orchestrated an elaborate facade of
institutional changes, to only deny that which he ended up doing:
clinging to power and usurping the spirit of the Republic’s
Constitution. This has become the incoherence of our current political
system, a structural transition from a semi-presidential republic to a
parliamentarian democracy; that is, an artificial transition that has
placed Armenia in a limbo, in a state of defeatist apprehension, a
shallow and embarrassing political system that suffocates from
self-righteousness and self-congratulation. This is, quite simply,
farcical.
As
the title of this article denotes, it is incumbent to address the
various achievements of Serzh Sargsyan. These achievements will be noted
in four areas: the constitutional referendum, military reforms, foreign
policy, and the economy.
The general consensus maintained that the Constitutional structure of
Armenia endowed far too much power upon the office of the president,
and as such, to allow for a healthy and systemic dispersion of power, a
parliamentary system was the most cogent alternative. Thus, under the
guise of structural democratization, Sargsyan orchestrated the 2015
constitutional referendum, where which the political and governing
system of the country would adopt a parliamentary structure. Innate to
this discourse was the concern that presidential powers in Armenia were
conducive to dictatorial tendencies, and as such, the transition to a
parliamentary system would offset this concern. This narrative was
embraced by Armenia’s European partners as well as much of the Western
world; that is, it was embraced in theory. Sargsyan utilized this
narrative for two main reasons. First, he was not able to satisfactorily
find a successor, and as such, he was not willing to risk the future
trajectories of political power in the hands of someone he cannot
control, or at the minimum, leverage. Second, contingent on this first
assessment, the success of the referendum and the transition to a
parliamentary system would deliver the corridors of power unto the
Republican Party, which will give Sargsyan the flexibility of either
playing the puppet master, or even assuming the Prime Ministership
himself. This perceived, long-term strategic maneuver would have been
deemed impressive and clever if not for one simple reason: most
observers and much of the opposition called Sargsyan out ahead of time
and exposed his so-called “tactical cleverness.” Forthwith, one of
Sargsyan’s most impressive achievements has been his shameless abuse of
authority, along with the realization that he is not the clever or
strategic chess-player that he fancies himself to be. When your
political endgame has already been predicted by your opponents, that
makes you neither strategic nor clever: it simply makes you a glorified
simpleton.
If Sargsyan is extolled for anything by his admirers, his security
and military credentials remain the epitome. Contextually, we may
address two obvious facts. First, Sargsyan has neither military
training, nor does he have the acumen of a general or of a military
tactician. Second, while Sargsyan excels at administrative capabilities
(specifically noting his functions as Robert Kocharyan’s underling
during the Artsakh War), this in no way legitimates his claims of being a
military man. Simply put, Sargsyan is a wannabe siloviki, a
bureaucratic hack who excels at abusing administrative resources to
advance his political self-interest. Sargsyan has no bonafides as either
a military leader or a competent operative in the realm of intelligence
or espionage. Consequently, he is neither general nor spymaster: he is a
bureaucratic operative who rose through the corridors of power fancying
himself a political animal. This is why Sargsyan remains utterly
uncomfortable with institutional reforms or broad-ranging policy
alterations: he is a creature of the status quo, and only budges in the
face of extreme risk aversion. This is most obviously attested when
observing military reforms in the armed forces; that is, the complete
absence of cogent reform until the Four Day War in 2016. Thus, only in
the face of crises, where obvious and embarrassing shortcomings were
revealed, did the Sargsyan Administration take steps at military
reforms: it basically took 8 years, a multi-pronged invasion by the
enemy, and a large loss of life for Sargsyan to finally realize the need
for reforms. Thus, if we are going to qualify Sargsyan’s military
achievements, they rest on two factors: 1) his inability to reform the
military, especially elements of corruption, that proved to have a
detrimental effect upon our national security; and 2) for being the
first leader since independence who happened to lose territory to the
enemy, regardless of the perceived relevance of this loss.
One
of the most baffling cases of governing incompetence has revolved
around the making and administering of Armenia’s foreign policy. It is
baffling for two important reasons. First, considering the impressive
intellectual manpower that Armenia produces, there happens to be a
complete lack of braintrust in Armenian foreign policy-making. With the
exception of a rising cadre of American and British-educated young
diplomats, who, of course, are not really taken into consideration
during policy formulation, Armenia’s foreign policy establishment is
comprised of Soviet-educated halfwits and pseudo-intellectuals. Unable
to orchestrate strategic initiative, resource-utilization, or even a
decent grand strategy, Armenia’s foreign policy has been reduced to two
precepts: conformist or reactionary. This, in turn, is complemented by
sheer intellectual laziness: in parts of the world where Armenians
display a healthy Diaspora, much foreign policy work is farmed out to
Diasporan lobbying organizations, with the Armenian embassy, in an
ad-hoc and at times disjunctive fashion, coordinating policy that lacks
cogency or operationalization. But, what can our expectations be, when
Sargsyan, for example, appoints
someone like Edward Nalbandyan, a connoisseur of incompetence, as
foreign minister. Or, for that matter, someone like Shavarsh Kocharyan,
while a genuinely good person, but a policy ignoramus, as deputy foreign
minister. Competent, energetic, highly-intelligent young diplomats are
either sent out as ambassadors to relatively small, irrelevant
countries, or shackled to bureaucratic responsibilities that suffocate
their skills. The second baffling aspect of Armenian foreign policy is
the complete lack of coherent policy principles. While suffering from
endless flaws, at least Kocharyan’s foreign ministry under Vartan
Oskanian had a cogent grand strategy under the “complementarity” policy,
which provided for some degree of actionable initiative. For the last
10 years under Sargsyan, Armenia has not had a cogent foreign policy
principle. Some have suggested it’s a “multi-vector” foreign policy,
only to realize this is the plagiarizing of Russia’s post-Cold War
policy. Some have suggested “neo-complementarity,” which, in essence, is
tautological and contradictory. Lacking the sufficient braintrust to
formulate effective foreign policy, the Sargsyan Administration’s relies
on two precepts: conformism in its relations with Russia, and
reactionary in its relations with the rest of the world. Simply put, the
Sargsyan Administration has lacked a proactive foreign policy
principle, relying on status-quo preservation, stagnation, and only in
the face of crises, engaging in reactive or reciprocal measures. In
comparison, while Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is collectively moronic,
amateur, and at times asinine, it is at least proactive, as it has
orchestrated a grand strategy to take the offensive against the
Armenians, and as such, place us in a defensive posture. Sure,
Azerbaijan miserably failed, especially through its Caviar Diplomacy,
but at least this was proactive, well-organized, and at times,
efficient. Compared to the mental-midgets of Azerbaijan’s foreign
ministry, Armenian policy should not only be taking the initiative, but
should robustly be maneuvering Azerbaijan into a highly defensive,
immobile posture. My underlying argument here is that Armenia has been
blessed, in the foreign policy realm, with an inept adversary; yet
instead of profoundly dominating them, we are allowing them to be on par
with us. This remains a singular achievement of the Sargsyan
Administration.
Similar
to the robust tourism industry, it boggles the mind that supporters of
the government point to the healthy growth of the Armenian IT sector, as
if this was somehow funded, organized, and developed by the government.
Fundamentally relying on the investments of patriotic Diasporans,
Armenia’s IT sector growth is a byproduct of devout and wealthy
Diasporan actors who invested in educational centers,
knowledge-transmission, importing of experts, and more importantly,
creating a culture where Armenia's human capital can shine. And shine it
has. But not because of anything that the Sargsyan Administration has
done. Their minimalist contributions, in opportunistic fashion, upon
which they have sought to syphon off credit from the tremendous work
done by the actual contributors to the country’s IT sector is quite
insulting. Even the current tax-exemptions that the government has
offered to IT startups reeks of nonsensical opportunism: the government
won’t invest in your growth, but at least it won’t squeeze you for the
money that you yet don’t have!
The Logic of Strategic Incoherence
The rational justification for selecting Sargsyan as PM, and hence
affirming the widely-held suspicion that this endeavor was a power grab,
reeks of strategic incoherence. Why did Sargsyan promise not to accept
the post of PM if he had no intentions of keeping his word? Or, can we
perhaps give him the benefit of the doubt, as some of his supporters
suggest, that he had every intention of not seeking the PM post, but
since a qualified, acceptable candidate was not found, then Sargsyan
remained the only tenable choice? If we accept the first argument, then
we have no choice but to concede that this entire endeavor was a
concerted effort to mislead the Armenian people through a prolonged
power grab. If, on the other hand, we give Sargsyan the benefit of the
doubt and lean toward the second argument, we still face a set of
irreconcilable problems. I will deconstruct this argument on their own
terms through a single example: Karen Karapetyan. On what basis can it
be presumed that Karen Karapetyan, for example, is not an acceptable
candidate for the position of PM? Is Karapetyan experienced? Of course;
while his tenure has been inflated and selectively hyped, he is,
however, quite functional and has displayed cogent organizational and
management skills in running the government. Is he a refined politician?
Karapetyan is far more elegant, appealing, and articulate than
Sargsyan. Is Karapetyan competent? Clearly there is an unquestionable
consensus among the RPA of Karapetyan’s excessive competence and
perceived accomplishments. Well, if Karaptyan is experienced, competent,
refined, and, based on his performance, fairly wise in the political
field, on what basis was Karapetyan excluded? The only logical argument,
at this stage, that Sargsyan’s supporters cling to is security:
Karapetyan lacks experience in military affairs. This argument, of
course, smacks of willful political ignorance. Namely, if military
expertise is a prerequisite for political leadership, than none of the
leaders of most of the developed world qualify to lead their powerful
countries. Contextually, then, Karapetyan may actually be a more cogent
candidate than Sargsyan, especially considering the fact that while
Sargsyan is immensely unpopular in the country, Karapetyan, however,
whether due to his charisma or panache, is actually quite liked by the
public. Forthwith, whichever lens we analyze the discourse, all
arguments fail to justify, on any rational basis, the selection of
Sargsyan as PM; with the exception, of course, that this was a
long-planned power grab. But then, we all knew that…so perhaps we can be
excused for our collective cynicism!
This unapologetic cynicism has given birth to a well-crafted culture
of scapegoating, where Sargsyan is insulated from any problems and
complexities that arise, thus laying the blame on subordinate ministers.
The inherent dishonesty of this approach, however, is obvious to all:
he was the one that in the first place appointed such ministers. Within
this context, Sargsyan only acts in the face of crisis, which then
require some form of reform or change, thus making his approach reactive
and stagnant, as opposed to proactive and functional. As such, when a
crisis does present itself, this unapologetic cynicism of scapegoating
creeps up: even though Sargsyan didn't do anything for all the years
that led to the crisis, it is still not his fault, but rather, those of
his ministers. Two simple examples are cases in point.
In
the midst of the economic recession that engulfed the global markets,
coupled with the heavy sanctions enacted against Russia by the West,
thus indirectly affected Armenia's economy, Sargsyan appointed Hovik
Abrahamyan as PM, upon relieving Tigran Sarkisyan from the same post. At
this stage, one immediately poses the most obvious question: on what
basis did any of us think that Abrahamyan will be able to, at any level,
produce positive outcomes? How can Sargsyan appoint someone like
Abrahamyan, renowned for not only being corrupt and incompetent, but, in
essence, a disgusting human being, as Prime Minister of the country?
Yet, when the economy neared the brink of collapse, coupled with the
turmoil created by the Sasna Tserer phenomenon, there was very little
blame on Sargsyan. Who was responsible for the dire economic conditions
of the country? That would be the Prime Minister, Mr. Hovik Abrahamyan,
the perfect scapegoat. The fact that Sargsyan appointed such an
incompetent and problematic individual to such an important position
escapes attention: all blame is placed on the scapegoat, and to appear
as a reform-minded, elder statesman, Sargsyan immediately moved to
replace him with a new PM. This modality of negating responsibility by
scapegoating is neither clever nor strategic: it is purely
dysfunctional.
This
modality of scapegoating in the face of crisis was also evident in the
consequences following the Four Day War in 2016. Lacking a developed
military policy or doctrine since 2007, the Defense Ministry was
operating in an outdated structure, led by a core of high-level officers
whose level of military education and penchant for corrupt practices
remained incommensurate with a modernizing young army and an excellent
young officer corps. That Sargsyan sat on these developments for nearly a
decade, only needing a full-blown Azeri assault to realize these
complications is again indicative of his achievement as an inactive
cynic; because, after all, the blame is going to be piled on someone
else. And this is precisely what happened. The consequences for the
shortcomings within the military in the April War were scapegoated upon
Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian (and few other generals who for years
had immense reputations for corruption). While Ohanian deserved his fair
share of criticism, we cannot deny that he was perhaps one of the more
competent Defense Ministers the Republic had for some time, and to
scapegoat him for the plethora of failures that were culminations of
forces beyond the Defense Minister’s scope remains purely dishonorable.
This methodology of tactical scapegoating in the face of crisis of which
the roots remain squarely at the failures of Sargsyan's policies
remains a prolific exercise in cynicism. Through this structured
narrative, Sargsyan succeeds at deflecting blame upon himself, thus
insulating his political capital, while through scapegoating ministers,
he postures himself as a reformer. Thus, he replaced the incompetent
Hovik Abrahamyan with the competent Karen Karapetyan; he replaced the
inept Seyran Ohanian with the young, energetic, reform-minded Vigen
Sarkissian.
Without an Endgame
The argument being made here is not purely on political grounds: we
must also consider the social psychology of the Armenian people. No to
over-engage in ontological abstractions, it should be noted that the
concept of hope has played a very important role in allowing Armenian
citizens to cope with their political world ever since independence.
Within this context, how do we confront the following question: What is
worse than being hopeless? The dire answer: Having false hope! And this
is precisely how Sargsyan operated when attempting to convince both the
opposition, and Western pundits, of what the future trajectories of
Armenia’s politics will be. He categorically stated that he would not
assume/accept the position of PM once his term was up. As such, he gave a
wide array of hope to all observers, domestic and in Diaspora, that a
healthy power transition will take place within the parliamentary
structure. What Sargsyan actually did, however, was orchestrate a
narrative that was fundamentally misleading, and even worse, he gave
everyone false hope! Needless to say, this comes to negate every form of
argument or hope that Sargsyan, or his supporters, may attempt to
suggest on the country’s future. By virtue of violating his own promise,
and thus negating any reason to believe in his words, no individual,
with speck of intellectual decency, will have reason to believe what
Sargsyan, or the RPA, say about the country’s future leadership. In this
context, Sargsyan violated his social contract with the Armenian people
by violating his own promise. For a self-proclaimed chess connoisseur,
this clearly cannot be his endgame; but, as has become evident, Sargsyan
himself does not known what the endgame is. Power, for the sake of
power, is not an endgame: it is a horrific precedent. And rest assured,
Sargsyan himself is concerned with this precedent.
The greatest danger, therefore, and the most vital complexity of
Sargsyan becoming PM is that it not only reinforces, but also justifies
the de-moralization of the Armenian citizen. The citizen, aside from its
already-embedded distrust of the political system, now views the future
in conspiratorial and defeatist terms. Simply put, we are seeing the de-citizenization
of Armenian society. This is truly a saddening development: our
political culture has been reduced to farce. The lamentations of
Armenian society have become the lamentations of the irrelevant, as an
ethos of apathy and helplessness defines our socio-political reality.
What this artificial transition has done is not simply extended
Sargsyan’s tenure, or the continued dominance of the RPA, or the
re-entrenchment of the oligarchic interests; more disturbingly, it has
proceeded, perhaps unwillingly, but nonetheless, in breaking the
political spirit of the Armenian people. The Armenian citizen is being
reduced to a political zombie, a broken, soulless creature that wonders a
landscape of hostile indifference.
"EVN Report," April 17, 2018 (https://www.evnreport.com/politics/in-praise-of-the-new-prime-minister-serzh-sargsyan-s-achievements)
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