Joe Matthews
Contrary to popular
belief, the Cuban missile crisis did not end with the agreement between
the US and Soviet Union in October, 1962. Unknown to the US at the time,
there were 100 other nuclear weapons also in the hands of Cuba,
sparking a frantic - and ingenious - Russian mission to recover them.
In November 2011, aware that the 50th anniversary of the most
dangerous few weeks in history was less than a year away, my Russian
colleague Pasha Shilov and I came across several new accounts that
changed our perspective on the Cuban missile crisis and how much we
thought we knew about it.
Growing up in Berkshire, England, through the nuclear
paranoia of the 1980s, with Ronald Reagan's Cruise and Pershing missiles
stationed only 30 miles away from my family home, I was inculcated with
a keen awareness of Cold War brinkmanship.
Pasha grew up in Moscow and described how it was from the Soviet point of view - equally frightening by his account.
But what we've now learned about the chilling events of
October and November 1962 has put our own experiences into perspective -
and maybe given rise to a few more grey hairs along the way.
Our investigations took us to St
Petersburg and the Soviet Submariners Veterans' Society via the National
Security Archive in Washington DC, where Svetlana Savranskaya, the
director of the Russian archives, told us an incredible story.
There had been a second secret missile crisis that continued
the danger of a catastrophic nuclear war until the end of November 1962.
This extended the known missile crisis well beyond the
weekend of 27-28 October, the time that had always been thought of as
the moment the danger finally lifted with the deal between Kennedy and
Khrushchev to withdraw the Soviet missiles in exchange for a US promise
not to invade Cuba.
The secret missile crisis came about through an unnerving mix
of Soviet duplicity, American intelligence failures and the mercurial
temperament of Fidel Castro.
The Cuban leader, cut out of the main negotiations between
the superpowers over the fate of the long range Soviet missiles
stationed in Cuba, began to cease cooperation with Moscow.
Fearing that Castro's hurt pride and widespread Cuban
indignation over the concessions Khrushchev had made to Kennedy, might
lead to a breakdown of the agreement between the superpowers, the Soviet
leader concocted a plan to give Castro a consolation prize.
The prize was an offer to give Cuba more than 100 tactical
nuclear weapons that had been shipped to Cuba along with the long-range
missiles, but which crucially had passed completely under the radar of
US intelligence.
Khrushchev concluded that because the Americans hadn't listed
the missiles on their list of demands, the Soviet Union's interests
would be well served by keeping them in Cuba.
Mikoyan, whose wife was
seriously ill, took the assignment knowing that the future of relations
between Cuba and the Soviet Union were on the line. Shortly after
arriving in Cuba, Mikoyan received word that his wife had died, but
despite this, he pledged to stay in Cuba and complete negotiations with
Castro.
In the weeks that followed, Mikoyan kept the detail of the
missile transfer to himself while he witnessed the mood swings and
paranoia of the Cuban leader convinced that Moscow had sold Cuba's
defence down the river.
Castro particularly objected to the constant flights over
Cuba by American surveillance aircraft and, as Mikoyan learned to his
horror, ordered Cuban anti-aircraft gunners to fire on them.
Knowing how delicate the state of relations were between the
US and Russia after the worst crisis since World War II, US forces
around the world remained on Defcon 2, one short of global nuclear war
until 20 November.
Mikoyan came to a personal decision that under no
circumstances should Castro and his military be given control of weapons
with an explosive force equal to 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs.
He then extricated Moscow from a seemingly intractable
situation which risked blowing the entire crisis back up in the faces of
Kennedy and Khrushchev.
On 22 November 1962, during a tense, four-hour meeting, Mikoyan
was forced to use the dark arts of diplomacy to convince Castro that
despite Moscow's best intentions, it would be in breach of an
unpublished Soviet law (which didn't actually exist) to transfer the
missiles permanently into Cuban hands and provide them with an
independent nuclear deterrent.
Finally after Mikoyan's trump card, Castro was forced to give
way and - much to the relief of Khrushchev and the whole Soviet
government - the tactical nuclear weapons were finally crated and
returned by sea back to the Soviet Union during December 1962.
This story has illuminated a chapter in history that has been partially closed for the past 50 years.
But it leaves us with a great respect for Mikoyan and his
ability to judge and eventually contain an extremely dangerous situation
which could have affected many millions of people.
"BBC News Magazine," October 12, 2012
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