Richard Kauzlarich (*)
“… [O]ur path is clear…. The system of
government and style of society we are developing in Azerbaijan is based
on Western values, including democratic pluralism, the free market
economy, and a secular republic that respect (sic) universal human
rights.”
Heydar Aliyev (quoted by Thomas Goltz in Azerbaijan Diary pg. 477)
On December 3, 2014 the Heydar Aliyev era in Azerbaijan ended. With
it went the previously close political relationship between the United
States and Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev, who was President of Azerbaijan
from 1993 until his death in 2003, presided over a foreign policy that
emphasized energy relations with the West, and political and security
engagement with the United States and a range of transatlantic
institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the Council on Europe (COE), European Union (EU) and
NATO. This policy eventually also led to Azeri military support for U.S.
operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. His son and successor,
Azerbaijan’s current president Ilham Aliyev, has increasingly moved away
from his father’s path and now seems to have approved a final rupture
with the past.
In his article, Mehdiyev asserts that from the beginning of Heydar
Aliyev’s presidency, the U.S. was plotting with domestic opposition
elements to create a “fifth column” to promote “color revolutions” while
pursing a policy of “double standards” to interfere in the internal
affairs of states around the world and Azerbaijan in particular. Using
non-governmental organizations, the U.S. sought to create an
international framework of “active agents” to promote “American
democracy.” Mehdiyev points to events in the former Yugoslavia and the
Arab Spring as evidence for this and then goes on to hold the U.S.
responsible for the “current crisis in international affairs.” Now,
Mehdiyev, declares, Azerbaijan must move away from the dominant world
power, and choose a new path of national consolidation built around
“strong presidential power and stability in society.” Azerbaijan must
have a “balanced” and “independent” foreign policy that prioritizes
enhancing Azerbaijan’s “image.”
Mehdiyev’s article has been accompanied by continuing attacks on the United States
in the mainstream Azeri press, and also by raids on the Baku bureau of
the U.S.-funded media service, RFE/RL, and arrests of leading
journalists with ties to the organization. Independent Azeri analysts,
internal opposition figures and groups that have secured international
funding, especially from the United States have also been targeted. Over 90 Azeris who fall under these categories—many young, and several women—were arrested during 2014. For some, their purported crime was questioning the vote count in the election that maintained Ilham Aliyev in power. For others, it was expressing critical views of the regime. A number of analysts and opposition activists were also arrested as “traitors” who support Armenia
(in reference to Azerbaijan’s long-standing conflict with Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh) and/or work for “foreign” (read U.S.) spies. Foreign
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) funding activities in Azerbaijan
have had their accounts frozen, forcing them to curtail and then close
their programs in Azerbaijan. U.S. officials, including congressional staffers, American ambassadors (bilateral and Minsk Group co-chair) and even the U.S. president himself have also been attacked.
Why Did U.S.-Azerbaijan Relationship Collapse?
Given the previous two decades of close relations and cooperation
between Azerbaijan and the United States, why did this happen? There
appear to be multiple, cumulative, triggers rooted in the anxiety of the
regime about the risks of a grassroots uprising or “color revolution”
similar to those in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in the 2000s; in the
regime’s reaction to and (mis)interpretation of a series of regional
developments; and most significantly in Baku’s deep frustration with
U.S. policies. The Aliyev regime has become steadily disillusioned with
the United States’ persistence in pressing Azerbaijan on its democratic
development and criticizing its failures on human rights. Azerbaijan has
long demanded that the United States recognize it as a strategic
partner given its importance as a major energy producer and its role as a
frontline state between both Russia and Iran. On this basis, Baku felt
entitled to certain exemptions regarding how it conducted its domestic
affairs and petitioned Washington to stop its criticism of the regime’s
domestic politics.
From Azerbaijan’s point-of-view, all of its efforts to work with the
United States through diplomatic engagement have borne little fruit. Azerbaijan is no closer to regaining the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
There have been no bilateral presidential meetings to boost the
international standing and “image” of Azerbaijan, and no pictures in the
Oval Office of a visiting Ilham Aliyev shaking hands with the U.S.
president. Instead, the direct engagement of U.S. NGOs and the Peace
Corps in Azerbaijan, and a series of U.S.-backed Track II efforts to
bring Azeris and Armenians together, seem to have brought more U.S. criticism and pressure on Baku for internal changes. RFE/RL coverage of regime corruption has added to the frustration.
In Azeri official perceptions, this compounds what Baku views as a
series of early injustices in the bilateral relationship with
Washington, D.C., which began in 1992 with Section 907 of the (first) Freedom Support Act.
This provision was attached to the first assistance legislation for the
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union due to pressure
from the Armenian-American community, in response to Azerbaijani
military action against Armenia. Section 907 banned U.S. assistance to
Azerbaijan until the fighting with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh was
brought to an end, and until the Azeris lifted an economic blockade they
imposed on Armenia in the 1990s. The U.S. government has subsequently
waived these provisions but not lifted them, and the episode continues
to dog Azerbaijan’s efforts to construct a strategic relationship with
the United States. based on energy and security cooperation—in spite of
an intense lobbying effort in Washington. Azerbaijan believes that the United States has never adequately reciprocated or respected Azerbaijan for all its efforts.
Over the past year, Baku’s view of the U.S. role in developments in
Ukraine has also accelerated the shift in Azerbaijan away from its
traditional foreign policy. From the regime’s point-of-view,
Washington’s support for the change in government in Kyiv was proof of
U.S. “double standards” in its approach to Azerbaijan and to regional
developments. From Baku’s perspective, Washington backed the overthrow
of the Ukrainian president and, left unchecked, the United States and
the local individuals and NGOs engaged in democracy and human rights
promotion in Azerbaijan would likely attempt to do the same. At the very
least, their activities, spotlighting the political and human rights
deficiencies in Azerbaijan, would ruin the country’s image as it
prepared to host the 2015 European Games. For Mehdiyev and others in the presidential administration, something clearly had to be done. In part, this explains the Christmas 2014 raid that closed down RFE/RL offices in Baku.
As much as the raid on RFE/RL was presented in Baku as a reaction to a
“U.S. threat,” the developments in Azerbaijan also reflect the regime’s
fear of its own people. Internal political developments in Ukraine
since the Russian intervention have shaken Azerbaijan’s political
leadership. For them, Ukraine is a model of the kind of disorder they
could also face. They need an “external threat” from the United States
to strengthen their narrative about the “internal threat” posed by a
young population demanding a greater say in the political future of
Azerbaijan, greater observance of fundamental human rights and more
opportunities for the free expression of their views. Given the recent
free-fall in global energy prices, the regime is also concerned that the
resulting drop in state revenues, which are almost entirely dependent on the energy sector,
will create additional economic stress. All of this has increased
regime paranoia about outside “meddling” (and not just by the United
States).
Indeed, Mehdiyev’s article and the domestic crackdown have coincided with the most serious military clashes with Armenia
since the 1994 cease-fire that froze the conflict over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. This has resulted in a series of rhetorical attacks on the OSCE Minsk Group
process and the United States for their failure to impose a settlement
favorable to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Both Azerbaijan
and Armenia have been involved in intensifying cease-fire violations in
the past year.
Implications for U.S. Relations with Azerbaijan
What are the implications and what can or should the United States do
about this? The United States can actually take pride in doing much for
Azerbaijan to preserve its independence and ensure its economic
prosperity. But, the U.S.- Azerbaijan relationship must now be based on
the new reality that Ramiz Mehdiyev imposed on December 3, 2014. It is
time for a new beginning. Mehdiyev’s candor about the future direction
for Azerbaijan could lead to a more normal and practical U.S. bilateral
relationship with Azerbaijan that is unencumbered by an impossible
search for a “strategic” relationship, and also for a relationship based
on “shared values.”
Given developments in the global energy market, access to
Azerbaijan’s energy is no longer the key political driver in our
relations that it was 20 years ago. As it should be, energy is now a
commercial and not a political issue. The improved prospects for a
nuclear deal with Iran, and Iran’s steps toward a more positive
engagement with the global community, could also mean an end to this
period of U.S.-Iranian confrontation. This is still a long shot but, if
it happens, Azerbaijan’s value as a partner in the U.S.’s regional
confrontations declines. Similarly, as the combat phase of U.S.-NATO
involvement in Afghanistan recedes, the need for a more robust security
relationship with Azerbaijan is reduced as well. Above all, we must now
avoid the trap of thinking that somehow Azerbaijan is an element in the
current conflict with Russia over Ukraine. It would be a mistake—even
absent the Mehdiyev polemic—to put Azerbaijan in a position where it
inevitably would be a liability rather than an asset in this
confrontation, given Baku’s own vulnerabilities to Moscow’s pressure.
The Mehdiyev attack on the mechanisms the U.S. government has used
for engaging Azerbaijan means that, first of all, we need a total review
(and not just of programs in Azerbaijan) of how the U.S. government
supports and advances the cause of democracy, human rights and freedom
of expression. Two decades of experience have proven that where these
rights and freedoms are seen as threats to entrenched regimes, U.S. NGOs
cannot succeed in promoting free and fair elections and human rights by
partnering with local individuals and organizations. In illiberal
democracies like Azerbaijan, governments will shut down the foreign
organizations and persecute local partners. New approaches including
creative use of social media must be considered to minimize the risk to
local partners—the individuals and organizations who become the targets
of the regimes. Second, and more specifically, the rabid
anti-Americanism of the past weeks in Azerbaijan, and the continued
detention of political prisoners requires more than expressions of U.S.
concern. David Kramer, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for
democracy, human rights and labor and I suggested targeted concrete steps to be taken in a piece last year.
Only One Thing Matters Post-December 3
Mehdiyev has reduced U.S.-Azerbaijani relations to its most essential
element: the peaceful resolution of the conflict with Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Nothing else is quite so consequential in
U.S.-Azerbaijani relations. It is time to set a clear target date for
the two sides to take advantage of the Minsk Group mediation efforts and
resolve this conflict peacefully. To do this we need to:
1. Insist that both sides appoint fully-empowered negotiators (as existed during the Heydar Aliyev period) to conduct face-to-face discussions based on the framework the Minsk Group has provided but without Minsk Group direct mediation.
2. Reopen the political space for Track II contacts between Armenians and Azeris. Securing the release of Azerbaijani political prisoners accused of treasonous contact with Armenians is a necessary element for this.
3. Insist that the framework discussions be completed by the fall of 2015. We have passed the period where both parties can cite the Minsk Group for failing to settle the dispute while they refuse to engage in serious diplomacy. In 2014, the risk of war increased. In 2015, we do not have time to continue business as usual.
Impossible? Not if Azerbaijan truly desires the
international and U.S. respect it seeks. Respect results from actions.
Freeing political prisoners and seriously negotiating with Armenia about
ending the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh are the only paths to earning
that respect.
www.brookings.edu, January 13, 2015
(*) Former U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan
www.brookings.edu, January 13, 2015
(*) Former U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan
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