Nanore Barsoumian
In April, I conducted an interview with Ara Papian, former Ambassador
of Armenia to Canada (2000-06) and president of the Modus Vivendi
Center, at the Armenian Weekly offices in Watertown. A former diplomat,
Papian’s perspective is that of a strategist with a long-term vision.
During the interview, we discussed the current geopolitical situation in
the Caucasus, including Armenia’s decision to join the Russian-led
Customs Union, military ties with Russia, U.S.-Armenia relations, the
Syrian crisis, the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and relations with
Turkey and Azerbaijan.
For Papian, Armenia has recently aligned itself dangerously close to
Russia, subject to the whims of its politicians. He believes that
Armenia’s independence is contingent on forging strong relations with
many key world players. “I see our independence as interdependence on
many powers,” he told me. “What I mean is, if we become dependent only
on one power—like Russia or the U.S.—we will really become dependent on them. If we depend on many players—China, Russia, the West, and so on—we will be more or less independent.”
Papian also warns that the close ties with Russia could backfire, as
the Russians would need to pull Azerbaijan into their orbit—and Karabagh
could serve as a bargaining chip. “Azerbaijan does not need any money.
They have money, which means the only thing Russia can offer Azerbaijan
is Karabagh. Then, we’ll come back to the situation we had in the late
80s, early 90s, when we were fighting both the Russians and Azeris,” he
said, adding, “We have to show the Russians that we are allies, but that
we are equal. We are not just a mean for them to solve their problems
with their neighbors.”
Discussing Turkey, Papian stresses that U.S. policy towards Erdogan’s
Turkey is “a policy of containment,” because evidence suggests that a
stronger Turkey is less manageable. “I think it’s in the interests of
the U.S. to have a stronger Armenia, because a stronger Armenia is less
dependent on Russia.”
As for the approaching Centennial of the Armenian Genocide, Papian
hopes to draft a legal framework on which to base Armenian demands. He
argues that compensation must be given to Armenians on three levels:
moral, in the form of a state issued apology; economic, to the families
of those who lost their properties; and in the form of an acknowledgment
that territories belonging to the Republic of Armenia (based on
President Woodrow Wilson’s map) is currently occupied by Turkey.
In addition, Papian proposes that a territory be outlined in the Van
area that will be under international control and part of the European
Union—without the displacement of its current population—where Armenians
are extended special privileges (for example, Armenia retains a right
to invest while Armenian companies pay taxes in Armenia). Papian argues
that such an arrangement would be in the interest of Turkey, as it is
likely to lose parts of those territories to Kurdish aspirations for
autonomy.
The full interview with Papian follows.
***
Armenian-Russian relations
Nanore Barsoumian—Please discuss
the historical context of Russian-Armenian relations as a backdrop to
the Sarkisian Administration’s decision to join the Russian-led Customs
Union (CU).
Ara Papian—Usually, it’s said that politics is
defined by geography and history. We know our geography, our neighbors,
and our relations with our neighbors. But relations largely depend on
history, which can be politicized—depending on the times, the regime,
the interpretation of history, and sometimes ideology. Armenian-Russian
relations, as all relations between nations, have had their ups and
downs. Unfortunately, our relations with Russia are not currently on the
ups, because I don’t think the Customs Union is in favor of Armenia.
Our taxes are much lower and our economic freedom in Armenia is much
greater than in Russia, which means that if we join the Customs Union,
prices—especially the price of consumer goods—will increase. We know
that at least a third of the Armenian population is poor. They will
become even poorer, and emigration, which is one of the main problems
for Armenia now, will increase.
N.B.—The decision to join the CU came as a surprise
to many. It was a 180-degree turn from the EU. Why did the Sarkisian
Administration make the move? What does Armenia stand to gain, and what
does it stand to lose?
A.P.—This was a surprise decision for everyone. Many
members of the ruling party are now saying it was predictable that we
were heading to the CU. But that is simply a lie. A couple of hours
before [President Serge] Sarkisian announced that Armenia would join the
CU [on Sept. 3, 2013], one of the leaders of the Republican Party,
Galust Sahakyan, said that we were going the European direction. I think
that something happened in Moscow. There was intensive pressure,
perhaps even blackmail against Armenia.
Unfortunately, over these past 20 years, we have become totally
dependent on Russia in our security issues, economy, and practically
everything. These have given Russia very strong leverage over us, and
they are misusing it. The decision [was to the benefit] of
Russia—perhaps not from an economic point of view because Armenia has a
small market, but as a political tool, mainly to show other countries,
namely Ukraine, that some countries are succumbing to the Customs Union.
However, after the events in Ukraine, it seems that Putin’s move had no
real results.
N.B.—Do you think Armenia had a choice?
A.P.—Armenia must create choices. If we take the
Sept. 3 announcement, at that time we had few choices. The problem is
that we had to create choices beforehand. Years ago, I had several
conversations with the political leadership—including then-President
[Robert] Kocharian and Prime Minister at the time [Serge]
Sarkisian—about finding alternative energy supply sources for Armenia.
Back then, Armenia had options, but it soon became clear that we were
going towards total dependence on Russia. Unfortunately, we did not do
anything back then.
When people say that the Customs Union will open the Russian market
to us, they are lying, because the Russian market is already open to us.
We already have dozens of agreements, treaties, and free trade
agreements with Russia. This will not add anything to our bilateral
relations. Similarly, [trade] with other countries, for instance with
Kazakhstan and Belarus, is done through bilateral relations. Creating
this Union will further complicate matters.
Russia is not our first [trading] partner. Our first trading partner
is the European Union. About 35 percent of Armenian trade is with
Europe. We also have large trade deals with China and the United Arab
Emirates. This means that the prices of all these goods that we are
importing from these countries will increase. Furthermore, it will
deprive us of any alternatives in the future.
N.B.—Some people highlight the military security
offered by Russia. There are Russian bases in Armenia, and the Turkish
border is manned by Russian troops. Many would argue that Armenia’s
survival is significantly dependent on Russia. What is the alternative,
speaking militarily, especially in case of renewed conflict with
Azerbaijan?
A.P.—As Americans say, let’s not mix apples with
oranges. Security issues with Russia are based on our participation in
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), on bilateral defense
treaties, on Russia having bases and forces in Armenia, and so on. It
has nothing to do with the Customs Union. It’s not like if we were to
sign an agreement with the EU the next day the Russians would withdraw
their forces from Armenia. They will never do that, even if we were to
ask them to, because Russian presence in Armenia is not for Armenia,
it’s for Russia. They are defending their southern border, not Armenia.
Meanwhile, yes, they are defending Armenia, but it’s in their favor. If
one day they decide it’s not in their favor, they will withdraw their
forces, as they did in 1917, as they did during the Karabagh War, and so
on.
If Russians will link our membership in the Customs Union with their
commitments to defend Armenia, it means that we do not have sincere
relations with them, because that is not how one treats an ally—by
blackmailing them…
What is the alternative? The presence of other countries.
N.B.—What do you mean by presence? Military bases?
A.P.—Yes, military bases. The Americans were
negotiating with Armenia in the 1990’s to rent or lease a small airport
in Armenia near Ardzni. We did not succeed in this. If we look at
Kyrgyzstan, it has had both Russian and U.S. military bases for years.
And both Russians and Americans are paying them rent. On the other hand,
Russians do not pay the Armenian government a dime for the Russian base
in Armenia. Furthermore, we cover a portion of their expenses, which is
unacceptable. It’s unimaginable that Americans, for example, maintain a
military base in Japan or Europe and the expense is covered by the
local governments.
We have to create alternatives. Otherwise, Russia will continue
blackmailing Armenia over relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and we
have been witnessing that in the last four to five years in particular.
Russians sold over $4 billion worth of weapons to Azerbaijan. Four
billion dollars! That is a huge amount of weapons!
N.B.—That happened leading up to the Customs Union decision…
A.P.—It was before the decision, and even after
Sarkisian’s announcement that we are ready to join the Customs Union.
People were saying that once we join the CU, Russians would treat us
better. We cannot see the evidence of that—things have continued the
same way. I’m afraid that relations might even get worse, because now
they totally control Armenia. Now, they want to have influence over
Azerbaijan, and influence comes with a price. Azerbaijan does not need
any money. They have money, which means the only thing Russia can offer
Azerbaijan is Karabagh. Then, we’ll come back to the situation we had in
the late 80s, early 90s, when we were fighting both the Russians and
Azeris.
Today, many have forgotten that our main war from 1989-91 was against
the Russians, not against Azerbaijan. And our two defeats in Karabagh—
in Shahumian and Mardakert—were both fighting the Russians, not Azeris.
How did we lose Shahumian? We lost because Russian forces—the special
airborne division—were fighting Armenians. This is why I always look at
today’s events through the lens of history. Because when you do not
learn from history, you repeat it.
We have to show the Russians that we are allies, but that we are
equal. We are not just a mean for them to solve their problems with
their neighbors. They did that in the 1920’s. They tried to solve their
problems with Turkey by giving them and Azerbaijan our lands. They would
do that again.
U.S.-Armenia relations, Turkey, and the Syrian crisis
N.B.— There is the perception that the U.S. will not
compromise its interests with Turkey, and that these are more closely
aligned than Russian interests with Turkey.
A.P.—Relations between Turkey and the U.S. are not
so simple. The policy of the U.S. towards Turkey is a policy of
containment for now. They understand and they see the evidence that when
Turkey becomes stronger, it becomes less and less manageable. That
means that Armenian issues—the genocide and the Karabagh issue—serve as
leverage against Turkey. If Turkey increases in strength—with its
neo-Ottoman ambitions—it will become a regional power. Regional powers
are less manageable. I think it’s in the interests of the U.S. to have a
stronger Armenia, because a stronger Armenia is less dependent on
Russia. Generally, U.S. interests are to have Russia’s neighbors be less
dependent on it.
After Ukraine, there will be big changes in U.S. policy. They
understood that if you want to have a friendlier Russia, Russia must be
weaker. Otherwise, it becomes more aggressive. The U.S. is seeing the
unification of old Soviet republics in one union by another name. What
is the Eurasian Union? It’s the same Soviet Union, but worse. In the old
Soviet Union all 15 republics were legally equal. In this new union,
there will be some gradations.
If we become a CU member, we will become dependent on Russia as much
as during Soviet times. However, during Soviet times, Russia had some
obligations towards Armenia and Armenians. It could not have allowed for
different wages, say, for engineers in Moscow and yerevan. For now,
Russia has no obligations; they only have rights in Armenia. They need
their [military] base and they need anti-Turkish feelings in Armenia,
because anti-Turkish feelings bring Armenia closer to Russia. This is
why the Kessab events were misrepresented in the Russian mass media.
Armenians have been looking at Russia with a more critical eye. That is
why they brought up the issue of the genocide, reminding Armenians that
they were slaughtered by Turks and that Kessab might be a warning.
N.B.—So you’re seeing this as a propaganda war.
A.P.—Yes, it is a dirty war because your
interpretation can be different, but what was done in Russian mass
media, on the level even of the Foreign Affairs Ministry—the Deputy
Minister spoke—it was a total lie that 80 Armenians were slaughtered
there, and so on. It is really unfortunate Armenians had to become
refugees again. We know that some 20 people were missing, but 80 people
were not slaughtered.
There is another detail there, as to why Kessab became a target for
Turks or Turkish-supported rebels. Two years ago Russia opened their
radar station near Kessab, and with this, the town became a target for
rebels. The main target was not the Armenian village, the main target
was the Russian military unit there.
This is in response to Russia for Crimea, because one of the reasons
why Russia took Crimea was the military seaport there—Sevastopol. But
Sevastopol without Tarsus, the port on the Mediterranean Sea, is
nothing. They would need to refuel. Tarsus was refueling Russian
military ships, which means that Russia took Crimea; now the West will
do everything to topple Assad not because the people who will gain power
are better than Assad (they know that they’re worse) but because Russia
will remain without military refueling in the Mediterranean, which
means all these gains of Russia in Ukraine will be worth nothing.
The problem with Syria and Armenians in Syria is that we are again
becoming part of a big game… To punish Russia, [the West] will punish
Russia’s allies and supporters: Syria, Armenia, and others. This is one
of the dangers of becoming too close to Russia. We have become much too
close with Russia. Look at the votes in the UN—11 countries supported
Russia, countries like Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, and
Belarus. It’s a really strong message to others. Russia can overcome all
these problems much easier than Armenia.
N.B.—You mean they can deal better with isolation…
A.P.—They can deal and survive. In the next 15
years, Russia is likely to lose lots of territories—like parts of
Siberia. Even with losing some territories, Russia will be the largest
country in Europe. But we do not have anything to lose. We have already
lost everything. This is the problem. Russia can afford to go against
the West. Armenia cannot. The path to survival is to keep a balance
between West and East. When I was an active diplomat, what we were doing
was just this—closer military relations with Russia, but closer
economic and cultural relations with the West, to counter-balance one
another. Now, we lost that balance.
N.B.—You said that it’s in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong Armenia. What has the U.S. been doing towards that goal?
A.P.—The U.S. is the country with largest donations
and grants to Armenia—over $2 billion. It’s much more than what comes
from Russia and others. Even private donations—through All Armenia Fund
and others—are tax-deductible, supported with U.S. taxpayers’ money. It
shows a positive attitude on the part of the U.S. government. The
problem with Armenia is that the U.S. cannot help Armenia if Armenia
does not want to be helped. It’s impossible. [The U.S.] was suggesting a
lot of things for Armenia, without results.
N.B.—You mean economic reforms…
A.P.— Economic reforms, as well as many other
investment policies. The West was trying to support Armenia, but
Armenia’s not Ukraine. It’s not as important for the West for it to go
against Russia. Putin is trying to create this “Soviet Union Lights.”
[The West] understands that Russia will lose Ukraine, and Russia without
Ukraine can never be a light version of the “Soviet Union”—like the
light version of regular cigarettes. It might be possible without the
Baltics, or some other countries, but not without Ukraine. The fight
over Ukraine is the biggest geopolitical fight of today. Unfortunately
for Russia, it made a big mistake—confronting the West and trying to
become the second power center of the world. Russia does not have the
capability to do that. It’s unfortunate for Armenia because Russia will
become weaker—if not within two years, than in five—and a weaker Russia
means a stronger Turkey in the Caucasus, and in the Black Sea. This is
time for Armenia to at least predict that and try to find the
counterbalance of Turkish influence. I see that [effort] in the West; I
see that in Iran. These signs of improved Iranian-Western relations give
us some hope.
Iranian nuclear negotiations and Armenia
N.B.—That leads us to another question. What are the implications of the Iranian nuclear negotiations for Armenia?
A.P.—Improvement in Iranian-Western relations will
be good for Armenia. First, Iran will be a substitute for Turkey.
Actually, Turkey gained much after the Iranian revolution. The Shah was
the closest ally of the U.S. Once the West lost Iran, they had to find
another country, and the only country was Turkey. Turkey gained
membership to NATO; bilateral relations with the U.S. also improved; and
lots of investment went there instead of Iran. From a security point of
view, improvement in relations with Iran will also be good as Iran will
become a stronger player in the region.
Actually, before the 18th century, the main players for
several hundred years were Turks and Iranians, and they were always
counterbalancing each other. It seems we are going back to that period.
The Russian border is in the North Caucasus now, and they have problems
there. They are losing their influence over neighboring countries. It’s
normal. Each empire has its period, and it seems that the time for the
Russian Empire is already over. They now have to be a normal regional
power—nothing more. For Armenians, it’s geopolitics. We have to see
what’s coming. We’d like to be totally independent, but that’s
impossible for Armenians. I see our independence as interdependence on
many powers. What I mean is if we become dependent only on one
power—like Russia or the U.S.—we will really become dependent on them.
If we depend on many players—China, Russia, the West , and so on—we will
be more or less independent.
The Crimean referendum and Karabagh
N.B.—I want to go back to the Crimean referendum.
Armenia was quick to support it, there was a celebration held in
Karabagh, and President Sarkisian viewed this as “yet another
realization of peoples’ right to self-determination.” How do you assess
this reaction and what might be the implications for Karabagh?
A.P.—To assess any referendum, we have to take into
consideration at least two main factors: legal and political. Russian
Special Forces were already in Crimea before the referendum took place.
They were the ones who decided the date of the referendum, even moved it
up to an earlier date—March 16. From a legal point of view, this is not
an expression of free will. In Karabagh, the situation was different.
There were no armed men from Armenia, I’m not even speaking about the
armed forces from Karabagh. What took place there in February 1988,
during Soviet times, was a peaceful self-determination. People expressed
their will, including the Azeris living in Karabagh, and because of
that Azerbaijan launched a war against the Armenians there, which
escalated into a bigger war. In Crimea, there was no free will. From a
political point of view, if we Armenians recognize the Crimean
referendum, and we justify it by saying that it was a case of
self-determination and Armenia has always supported
self-determination—no, we did not recognize the independence of Kosovo,
Abkhazia, Ossetia, and so on. This is the first case that Armenia has
supported a peoples’ self-determination. We have to assess the negative
and positive implications of this. We should have at least tried to
abstain during the voting. With this vote, we became part of a very
small club of countries, and now there are tensions with the West. How
will this work out, I don’t know. Politics are largely based on the
personal feelings of politicians. If they view us as part of some evil
group of people, they will treat us the same way they treated the “evil”
nations—like [Belarus’s Alexander] Lukashenko…
Armenia needs the West for investments. Without the West, there will
not be any investments—technological or otherwise—in Armenia. Russia is
not capable of doing it. We know that. Seven or eight years ago, we gave
Russia the best factories in Armenia: Mars, Mergelyan, and so on. There
were lots of promises—they were going to revive and reopen them. During
these 8-10 years nothing has been done. It’s not like they don’t want
to do anything, just that they are incapable of it. They do not have the
funds or the technology for it. Russia itself has so many closed
factories, they lack the funds even for those. The state budget of
Russia is half of the budget of the Pentagon—can you compare?
N.B.—But the West is not really willing to invest in Armenia…
A.P.—Yes. But for that you have to create the right
conditions. There are people who are illegally deprived of their
businesses, who face legal obstacles, like higher Customs duties and
taxes. Money likes going places where conditions allow it to multiply.
If we create the conditions, money will come. Otherwise, nobody will
invest—not even Armenians.
Armenia-Turkey relations, the Genocide Centennial, and a vision for the future
N.B.—Could you talk about Turkey-Armenia relations as we approach the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide?
A.P.—Unfortunately, there haven’t been success
stories here either. I was trying to at least prepare for the Centennial
by creating a legal package on which we can base our demands. For me
the genocide is not a simple matter of recognition. Genocide is a crime;
and we cannot punish the criminals because they are all dead. We have
to at least get some compensation. This must be done on three levels:
moral, which means acknowledgement and apology on the state level;
economic compensation to the families and people who lost properties;
and on the level of territory, acknowledgement that part of the
territory of the Republic of Armenia—I must underline that not Armenian
territories, but territories of Wilsonian Armenia—is occupied by Turkey.
There must at least be acknowledgement of that fact and then
negotiations on how we can find a solution that can satisfy Armenians,
Turks, and also Kurds.
My suggestion was to create a territory that will be a part of the
European Union, which would mean free movement of capital and people. It
would also mean that Armenia can invest in Van, perhaps build a hotel
there, but pay taxes in Armenia as an Armenian company. The plan would
see the borders opened. In history, we do have cases of so-called
“condominiums” where two or three countries govern one territory. I do
understand that there are around 7 million people living in Wilsonian
Armenia—and we cannot force them out. My idea is to have special
privileges based on international law there, which means that this
territory can become for Armenia a way to prosperity. The territory
would be demilitarized and under international control, which would pose
less of a military danger towards Armenia. War in Karabagh will also be
less of a possibility, because Azerbaijan will always look towards its
big brother Turkey, and I doubt they will risk waging a war against
Armenia. We would still keep some forces on our Western border.
Unfortunately, we haven’t done any of this. The Centennial is
important but it doesn’t seem to be principally different [than previous
years]—exhibitions, publishing or republishing books, lectures, even
concerts, and so on. What’s different? We’ve been doing these for 40-50
years. For me 100 years is a symbolic date. At least we have to present
our vision—how we envision a solution to the problem. And then let’s
negotiate. This must be done by the Armenian state.
N.B.—What would Turkey gain from this? What would prompt them to make such concessions?
A.P.—Look at the demographics. Turks can see that
sooner or later they will lose these territories because the growth rate
for Kurds in Turkey is much higher than that of Turks. This is the most
important factor—they have to make a strategic choice. What is in their
favor: to have a big Kurdistan, with mainly people who will always
fight on their border, or to have a territory over which they will have
control, supported by Armenians, Europeans, and Americans—which means
they will share rights and duties over that territory? The choice is
between total loss of a territory and keeping something. Which of these
is to their benefit?
N.B.— Could it be that doing one won’t prevent the
other from happening? In other words, what would prevent Kurds from
wanting their autonomy?
A.P.—I’m sure you have been reading a lot of
information about Hamshen Armenians and Islamized Armenians in Turkey.
There is a revival of Armenian feelings in Western Armenia. What’s going
on? These are efforts by Turks and the Turkish government. It is not as
simple as one day [the Hamshen and Islamized Armenians] said, ‘OK, we
are Armenians,’ and that groups from Armenia just happened to visit,
dance, and sing there. [The Turkish government] could completely close
off the area within 24 hours. But creating an Armenian presence there is
a counterbalance against Kurdish presence. Not in the short term, but
in the long term—in 25-50 years—it will be in their favor to have my
solution towards that territory. Many Turks—high officials—told me
during private conversations that it was their strategic mistake to kill
the Armenians. They were not speaking from a moral point of view, but
from a strategic one. They said that tactically they gained, because
they cleaned Turkey from Armenians. But strategically, they lost,
because Armenians were counterbalancing the Kurds in those
territories—around 40 percent were Armenians, 40 Kurds, and 20 Turks.
Neither the Armenians nor the Kurds could gain independence. By killing
the Armenians, they opened the door for Kurdish independence. They are
realizing that now after 100 years.
In politics, sometimes it may seem that you are gaining a lot, but in
the long term, you will find that you are losing. The same happened
between Russia and Ukraine. In the short term they gained Crimea, but in
the long term they lost Ukraine, the largest European country. Politics
is actually based on keeping balances. If we show that Armenian
presence in the Middle East and a bigger Armenia is in favor of many
nations, they will support us. For now, however, that will not be the
case, because now they will think that if Armenia were to become bigger,
Russian influence will become stronger in the Middle East. That was the
case in 1945-46 when the Russians were trying to take Turkey and the
West was against it—not because they were against Armenians—but because
they saw that if Russia occupied or liberated Western Armenia, it would
not be Armenia, but Russia. The same is happening now. Many see Armenian
aspirations in Karabagh, Nakhichevan, and so on, as a product of
Russian politics.
"The Armenian Weekly," May 18, 2014
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